Voluntary disclosures as a form of impression management to reduce evaluative uncertainty during M&A

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

    Abstract

    This study develops and tests a set of hypotheses on how to manage investors’ evaluative uncertainty during M&A through a specific form of impression management, namely, interim news events. We suggest that voluntary disclosures are key in influencing investors’ reactions during M&A. Empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of 36,376 deals and 163,023 associated interim news events carried out by NYSE and NSDQ listed organizations over 10 years. Our research contributes to literature on voluntary disclosures, impression management, and managing M&A.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages1364-1369
    Number of pages6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014
    Event74th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2014 - Philadelphia, United States
    Duration: 1 Aug 20144 Aug 2014

    Conference

    Conference74th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2014
    Country/TerritoryUnited States
    CityPhiladelphia
    Period1/08/144/08/14

    UN SDGs

    This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

    1. SDG 9 - Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
      SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Management Information Systems
    • Management of Technology and Innovation
    • Industrial relations

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Voluntary disclosures as a form of impression management to reduce evaluative uncertainty during M&A'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this