Abstract
In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically 'demanding'. Finally, we show how the pay-performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensation contracts and how they are set.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 478-503 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Long Range Planning |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Aug 2000 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Funding
We would like to thank Weedie Sissons and seminar participants at Tilberg (Eindhoven) and Wharton for useful discussions and comments during the preparation of this article. The advice and comments from practitioner colleagues at PricewaterhouseCoopers is much appreciated. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (award number R000237246). Appendix A
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Finance
- Strategy and Management