The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence

Martin J. Conyon, Simon I. Peck, Laura E. Read, Graham V. Sadler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

44 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically 'demanding'. Finally, we show how the pay-performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensation contracts and how they are set.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)478-503
Number of pages26
JournalLong Range Planning
Volume33
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2000
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

evidence
performance
Option contract
Executive compensation
contract
firm
interview
Chief executive officer
Performance criteria
Fiscal
Wealth
Performance pay
Stock options
CEO compensation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Finance
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts : UK Evidence. / Conyon, Martin J.; Peck, Simon I.; Read, Laura E.; Sadler, Graham V.

In: Long Range Planning, Vol. 33, No. 4, 01.08.2000, p. 478-503.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Conyon, Martin J. ; Peck, Simon I. ; Read, Laura E. ; Sadler, Graham V. / The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts : UK Evidence. In: Long Range Planning. 2000 ; Vol. 33, No. 4. pp. 478-503.
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