The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence

Martin J. Conyon; Simon I. Peck; Laura E. Read; Graham V. Sadler

doi:10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00054-6

The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence

Martin J. Conyon, Simon I. Peck, Laura E. Read, Graham V. Sadler

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

52 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically 'demanding'. Finally, we show how the pay-performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensation contracts and how they are set.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	478-503
Number of pages	26
Journal	Long Range Planning
Volume	33
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00054-6
Publication status	Published - 1 Aug 2000
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Geography, Planning and Development
Finance
Strategy and Management

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The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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