The use of international peacebuilding as a delivery vehicle for preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives is a recent and pivotal development in United Nations (UN) counterterrorism strategy. However, existing research has not considered the contradictions that emerge when international organizations transition to new peacebuilding approaches such as PVE. Further, it remains unclear whether and how intervening organizations overcome these contradictions. Based on forty-seven interviews with UN, government, and nongovernmental organization officials in Kyrgyzstan and New York this article critically analyzes the shift to PVE as an underlying strategic approach to UN peacebuilding and the mismatch between external expectations and local priorities. Interview narratives feature ambiguity in conceptions of foundational PVE concepts and in how interveners reference a menu of drivers for violent extremism according to project requirements. This article argues that ambiguity is strategically tolerated and employed, whereby not clarifying the terms of engagement with (sub-)national counterparts supports external agendas and achieves a basic unity of purpose by permitting counterparts increased managerial latitude to satisfy self-interests.
Bibliographical noteContact: Chuck Thiessen, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org; email@example.com, Assistant Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Coventry, Building 5 - Innovation Village, Cheetah Road, CV1 2TL, Coventry, UK.
FunderFieldwork was supported by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Grant.
- United Nations
- preventing violent extremism
- strategic ambiguity
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Political Science and International Relations