The Ethics of Deferred Prosecution Agreements for MNEs Culpable of Foreign Corruption: Relativistic Pragmatism or Devil’s Pact?

Glauco De Vita; Donato Vozza

doi:10.1017/beq.2023.36

The Ethics of Deferred Prosecution Agreements for MNEs Culpable of Foreign Corruption: Relativistic Pragmatism or Devil’s Pact?

Glauco De Vita, Donato Vozza

Research Centre for Business in Society

University of Roehampton

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are legal means, alternative to trial, for the resolution of criminal business cases. Although DPAs are increasingly used in the US and are spreading to other jurisdictions, the ethics of DPAs has hardly been subjected to critical scrutiny. We use a multidisciplinary approach straddling the line between philosophy and law to examine the ethics of DPAs used to resolve cases of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) foreign corruption. Deontologically, we argue that the normativity of DPAs raises critical concerns related to the notion of justice as punishment, with serious cases of international corruption resolved with minimal retribution for offending MNEs. Taking a utilitarian ethical perspective, we also evaluate the effect of DPAs on MNEs’ tendency to self-regulate or re-offend. Our conclusion, supported by critical analysis of the juridical literature and case evidence on MNEs’ recidivism, is that DPAs do not foster ethical behavior.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	(In-Press)
Number of pages	29
Journal	Business Ethics Quarterly
Volume	(In-Press)
Early online date	13 Feb 2024
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2023.36
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 13 Feb 2024

Bibliographical note

© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for Business Ethics

Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from it. This article has been published in a revised form in Business Ethics Quarterly [http://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2023.36 P]. This version is published under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND. No commercial re-distribution or re-use allowed. Derivative works cannot be distributed.

Keywords

Deferred Prosecution Agreement
negotiated justice
ethics of justice
Business Ethics
punishment
Criminal Justice

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1017/beq.2023.36

De Vita2024AAM Accepted author manuscript, 0.98 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "The Ethics of Deferred Prosecution Agreements for MNEs Culpable of Foreign Corruption: Relativistic Pragmatism or Devil{\textquoteright}s Pact?",

abstract = "Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are legal means, alternative to trial, for the resolution of criminal business cases. Although DPAs are increasingly used in the US and are spreading to other jurisdictions, the ethics of DPAs has hardly been subjected to critical scrutiny. We use a multidisciplinary approach straddling the line between philosophy and law to examine the ethics of DPAs used to resolve cases of multinational enterprises{\textquoteright} (MNEs) foreign corruption. Deontologically, we argue that the normativity of DPAs raises critical concerns related to the notion of justice as punishment, with serious cases of international corruption resolved with minimal retribution for offending MNEs. Taking a utilitarian ethical perspective, we also evaluate the effect of DPAs on MNEs{\textquoteright} tendency to self-regulate or re-offend. Our conclusion, supported by critical analysis of the juridical literature and case evidence on MNEs{\textquoteright} recidivism, is that DPAs do not foster ethical behavior.",

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The Ethics of Deferred Prosecution Agreements for MNEs Culpable of Foreign Corruption: Relativistic Pragmatism or Devil’s Pact?

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

UN SDGs

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