The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games

E. Cartwright, A. Stepanova

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We revisit the question of whether a refund increases efficiency in threshold public good games. New experimental evidence is presented on the effect of endowment size. We demonstrate that a refund increases efficiency if and only if the endowment is small relative to the threshold. We also propose a novel way to analyze the effect of a refund. Specifically, we argue that a refund increases efficiency only if significantly many groups converge towards zero contributions in the absence of a refund.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)29-33
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume134
Early online date11 Jun 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2015

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Refunds
Endowments

Keywords

  • Public good
  • Threshold
  • Refund
  • Money back guarantee

Cite this

The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. / Cartwright, E.; Stepanova, A.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 134, 09.2015, p. 29-33.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Cartwright, E & Stepanova, A 2015, 'The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games' Economics Letters, vol. 134, pp. 29-33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032
Cartwright E, Stepanova A. The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. Economics Letters. 2015 Sep;134:29-33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032
Cartwright, E. ; Stepanova, A. / The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. In: Economics Letters. 2015 ; Vol. 134. pp. 29-33.
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