The Board of Directors and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies

Alessandro Merendino, Rob Melville

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    44 Citations (Scopus)
    573 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Purpose: This study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice. Design/methodology/approach: This research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership. Findings: While directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance. Research limitations/implications: This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance. Practical implications: This paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company. Originality/value: The results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)508-551
    Number of pages44
    JournalCorporate Governance
    Volume19
    Issue number3
    Early online date28 Mar 2019
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 3 Jun 2019

    Keywords

    • Agency theory
    • Board of directors
    • Company performance
    • Corporate governance
    • Italy
    • Listed companies

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)

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