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Strategic Market Games and Ricardo

  • Waseem Toraubally

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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    Abstract

    We develop a Ricardian market game to show that in non-Walrasian economies, the Law of Comparative Advantage (LCA) à la Ricardo-Haberler (1817; 1936) can fail. Trade is driven, not by comparative advantages, but by strategic behaviour. This leads to a new and somewhat surprising result: it is shown in a Ricardian economy that at equilibrium, by both exporting and importing goods in which they have a comparative disadvantage, countries can Pareto improve on when they specialise as per the LCA, which in turn Pareto dominates autarky.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalEconomics Bulletin
    Volume37
    Issue number4
    Publication statusPublished - 19 Nov 2017

    Bibliographical note

    The Economic Bulletin is an open-access letters journal.

    Keywords

    • Shapley-Shubik Market Games
    • Endogenous commodity-price formation
    • Comparative Advantage
    • JEL: D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
    • C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General

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