Purpose: The purpose of this study is to study the evolution of French corporate governance law in light of collibration approach and bring statistical evidence from French Companies Executive Compensation practices. Design/methodology/approach: The study has used mixed methods. In the first part, the authors analyzed the French laws in the light of collibration. In the second part of the study, the authors used unbalanced panel data to test the hypotheses related to executive remuneration based on the theoretical underpinning of collibration. Data for 173 firms listed in the Euronext Paris Index is collected from the Bloomberg database. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis is performed to investigate the impact of collibration on the governance disclosure of French-listed firms. Findings: SUR results indicate that board size plays a significant role in the governance disclosure before collibration. However, the collibration model is found to be more effective in ensuring the desired level of governance disclosure. Under the collibration approach, executive remuneration, frequency of board meetings, executive directors in the compensation committee and independent directors play a significant role in governance disclosure. Board size, however, does not have a substantial impact on governance disclosure after the adoption of collibration mechanism. Research limitations/implications: Results provided by this study can allow regulators to improve corporate disclosure regime in France, which could play a vital role in safeguarding the interest of stakeholder. Originality/value: The authors study the impact of collibration on the extent of governance disclosure in the context of France. Empirical evidence on the implication of collibration as governance mechanisms to enhance stakeholder confidence is rare and allows this study to make a unique contribution to the governance literature.
|Number of pages||23|
|Journal||International Journal of Law and Management|
|Early online date||10 Nov 2020|
|Publication status||Published - 10 Feb 2021|
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- Corporate governance
- Executive compensation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management