Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly

R. Amir, A. Stepanova

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

88 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the issue of first- versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or complements, dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions. We show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first-mover advantage. For the linear version of the model, we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance. The analysis yields, as the unique equilibrium outcome, sequential play with the low-cost firm as leader.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-20
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume55
Issue number1
Early online date15 Aug 2005
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2006
Externally publishedYes

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Price leadership
Costs
Duopoly
Equilibrium selection
Strategic substitutes
First-mover advantage
Endogenous timing
Differentiated products
Risk dominance

Keywords

  • Price competition
  • Endogenous timing
  • First/second-mover advantage
  • Risk dominance

Cite this

Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly. / Amir, R.; Stepanova, A.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 55, No. 1, 04.2006, p. 1-20.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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