This paper investigates the problem of false data injection attack (FDIA) detection in microgrids. The grid under study is a DC microgrid with distributed boost converters, where the false data are injected into the voltage data so as to investigate the effect of attacks. The proposed algorithm uses a bank of sliding mode observers that estimates the states of the neighbor agents. Each agent estimates the neighboring states and, according to the estimation and communication data, the detection mechanism reveals the presence of FDIA. The proposed control scheme provides resiliency to the system by replacing the conventional consensus rule with attack-resilient ones. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed method, a real-time simulation with eight agents has been performed. Moreover, a verification experimental test with three boost converters has been utilized to confirm the simulation results. It is shown that the proposed algorithm is able to detect FDI attacks and it protects the consensus deviation against FDI attacks.
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- DC microgrid
- attack-resilient control
- boost converter
- sliding mode observer
- false data injection cyber attack