R&D with spillovers: Monopoly versus noncooperative and cooperative duopoly

A. Stepanova, A. Tesoriere

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper compares industry profit and R&D propensity for a duopoly conducting either noncooperative or cooperative R&D and a monopoly, using two different basic models of strategic R&D. One postulates spillovers in R&D inputs and predicts that equilibrium joint profit and R&D levels are always larger under monopoly. The other postulates spillovers in R&D outputs and sometimes predicts that joint profit and R&D levels are larger under either of the alternative scenarios. In addition, unlike input spillovers, spillovers in R&D outputs sometimes exert a positive effect on both effective and private noncooperative R&D levels.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)125-144
Number of pages20
JournalManchester School
Volume79
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Dec 2010

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Spillover
Monopoly
Duopoly
Profit
Propensity
Industry
Scenarios

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R&D with spillovers: Monopoly versus noncooperative and cooperative duopoly. / Stepanova, A.; Tesoriere, A.

In: Manchester School, Vol. 79, No. 1, 16.12.2010, p. 125-144.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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