Pricing-based Stackelberg game for spectrum trading in self-organised heterogeneous networks

In this study, the spectrum trading problem in a self-organised and two-tier heterogeneous cellular network is studied and the bandwidth sharing problem incorporated with cell range expansion technique is formulated as a Stackelberg game. Maximising the revenue of macro eNodeB (MeNB), affording minimum required bandwidth for each home eNodeB (HeNB), enhancing per femto-user throughput, and providing better quality of service for macro-users nearby each femto-cell are the main objectives of this investigation. The authors propose an iterative scheme in which MeNB and HeNBs make decisions autonomously. The MeNB as the spectrum provider decides on the unit-bandwidth price with the objective to maximise its revenue. Each HeNB, on the other side, decides on the amount of requested bandwidth as well as the number of possible nearby macro-users which will support to take advantage of MeNB discounting. The designed discounting strategy is applied for the extra bandwidth request of HeNBs to encourage them in supporting nearby macro-users. It is shown analytically that the proposed scheme converges to a unique Nash equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. Evaluating the authors' game through different simulations demonstrates that it is all beneficial for both MeNB and HeNBs and the social welfare is maximised in the network.