This article analyses the dynamics of post-election elite bargaining and coalition formation in the cases of Iraq and Morocco, demonstrating that, despite widely differing contexts, the outcome is often far removed from the election results. Recent works on political parties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have alluded to this state of affairs, but so far, the scholarship is missing in-depth comparative studies of the intricate dynamics of elite bargaining and coalition formation. Beyond not necessarily connecting to the election results, but rather being rooted in competition over access to patronage resources and power, our comparison demonstrates the negative impact that this state of affairs has on the government’s ability to govern.
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- political parties