Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 3 |
| Journal | The Australasian Journal of Logic |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 4 Jan 2015 |
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Keywords
- paraconsistent logic
- Soros game
- rational self-interest
- Prisoner's Dilema
- game theory
- evolutionary game theory
Cite this
Paraconsistent games and the limits of rational self-interest. / Daynes, A.; Andrikopoulos, Panos; Pagas, P.; Latimer, D.
In: The Australasian Journal of Logic, Vol. 12, No. 1, 3, 04.01.2015.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Paraconsistent games and the limits of rational self-interest
AU - Daynes, A.
AU - Andrikopoulos, Panos
AU - Pagas, P.
AU - Latimer, D.
PY - 2015/1/4
Y1 - 2015/1/4
N2 - It is shown that logical contradictions are derivable from natural translations into first order logic of the description and background assumptions of the Soros Game, and of other games and social contexts that exhibit conflict and reflexivity. The logical structure of these contexts is analysed using proof-theoretic and model-theoretic techniques of first order paraconsistent logic. It is shown that all the contradictions that arise contain the knowledge operator K. Thus, the contradictions do not refer purely to material objects, and do not imply the existence of inconsistent, concrete, physical objects, or the inconsistency of direct sensory experience. However, the decision-making of rational self-interested agents is stymied by the appearance of such intensional contradictions. Replacing the rational self-interest axioms with axioms for an appropriate moral framework removes the inconsistencies. Rational moral choice in conflict-reflexive social contexts then becomes possible.
AB - It is shown that logical contradictions are derivable from natural translations into first order logic of the description and background assumptions of the Soros Game, and of other games and social contexts that exhibit conflict and reflexivity. The logical structure of these contexts is analysed using proof-theoretic and model-theoretic techniques of first order paraconsistent logic. It is shown that all the contradictions that arise contain the knowledge operator K. Thus, the contradictions do not refer purely to material objects, and do not imply the existence of inconsistent, concrete, physical objects, or the inconsistency of direct sensory experience. However, the decision-making of rational self-interested agents is stymied by the appearance of such intensional contradictions. Replacing the rational self-interest axioms with axioms for an appropriate moral framework removes the inconsistencies. Rational moral choice in conflict-reflexive social contexts then becomes possible.
KW - paraconsistent logic
KW - Soros game
KW - rational self-interest
KW - Prisoner's Dilema
KW - game theory
KW - evolutionary game theory
U2 - 10.26686/ajl.v12i1.2021
DO - 10.26686/ajl.v12i1.2021
M3 - Article
VL - 12
JO - The Australasian Journal of Logic
JF - The Australasian Journal of Logic
SN - 1448-5052
IS - 1
M1 - 3
ER -