Monopoly versus Ramp;D-integrated duopoly

R. Amir, N. Nannerup, A. Stepanova, E. Eguiazarova

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the standard two‐stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture, using two well‐known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. According to the model with a wider scope of application, monopoly always leads to a higher propensity for R&D and, when R&D costs are low, to the best overall market performance. The results also allow for a comparison between the two underlying models of strategic R&D.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)88-100
Number of pages13
JournalManchester School
Volume70
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Integrated
Monopoly
Duopoly
Research joint ventures
Propensity
Market performance
Costs
Product market competition
Spillover

Cite this

Monopoly versus Ramp;D-integrated duopoly. / Amir, R.; Nannerup, N.; Stepanova, A.; Eguiazarova, E.

In: Manchester School, Vol. 70, No. 1, 2002, p. 88-100.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Amir, R, Nannerup, N, Stepanova, A & Eguiazarova, E 2002, 'Monopoly versus Ramp;D-integrated duopoly' Manchester School, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 88-100. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00285
Amir, R. ; Nannerup, N. ; Stepanova, A. ; Eguiazarova, E. / Monopoly versus Ramp;D-integrated duopoly. In: Manchester School. 2002 ; Vol. 70, No. 1. pp. 88-100.
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