Leadership selection in an unlimited three-echelon supply chain

Peng Jia, Hannan Amoozad Mahdiraji, Kannan Govindan, Ieva Meidutė

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)
3 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Supply chain (SC) management aims to increase the overall profit through improvement of various activities and components. Many contradictions between parts and different levels of a SC have been identified in order to achieve overall objectives. Such shortfalls may result in decreased strength and competitiveness of the SC. This paper considers the main conflicts related to inventory, pricing and marketing costs in an unlimited three-echelon supply chain. Aimed at avoiding a profit decrease, the research focuses on finding an equilibrium between inventory, pricing and marketing cost of an unlimited three-echelon SC. On each level, the best leadership option with the greatest payoff is sought for between K retailer, M manufacturer and S supplier. According to Stackelberg non-cooperative game theory, each SC level can become a decision-making leader depending on the available negotiating power. Consequently, three leadership types
are modelled on each level and the total SC profit is calculated and compared to ascertain the best option. The authors of the article found that transfer of leadership from a retailer to supplier results in reduction of the total profit. In addition, the research focused on the main effects of parameters used in leadership models. Finally, validation of the proposed model was examined by simulation and Arena software, which indicated that models based on a game theory were performed accurately.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)616–637
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Business Economics and Management
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2013
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Supply chain
Profit
Pricing
Marketing
Suppliers
Costs
Retailers
Game theory
Competitiveness
Decision making
Negotiating
Simulation
Non-cooperative game theory
Software
Stackelberg
Supply chain management

Bibliographical note

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Keywords

  • supply chain
  • non-cooperative game
  • Stackelberg game
  • design of experiment
  • simulation models

Cite this

Leadership selection in an unlimited three-echelon supply chain. / Jia, Peng; Amoozad Mahdiraji, Hannan ; Govindan, Kannan; Meidutė, Ieva.

In: Journal of Business Economics and Management, Vol. 14, No. 3, 06.2013, p. 616–637.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Jia, Peng ; Amoozad Mahdiraji, Hannan ; Govindan, Kannan ; Meidutė, Ieva. / Leadership selection in an unlimited three-echelon supply chain. In: Journal of Business Economics and Management. 2013 ; Vol. 14, No. 3. pp. 616–637.
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