Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries

Simplice Asongu, Jacinta Nwachukwu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)
5 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This article complements existing literature on the aid-institutions nexus by focusing on political rights, aid volatilities, and the post-Berlin Wall period. Our findings show that, while foreign aid does not have a significant effect on political rights, foreign aid volatilities do mitigate democracy in recipient countries. Such volatilities could be used by populist parties to promote a neocolonial agenda, instill nationalistic sentiments, and consolidate their grip on power. This is especially true when donors are asking for standards that the majority of the population in control does not want and political leaders are unwilling to implement them. Our empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period from 1996 to 2010. As a main policy implication, creating uncertainties in foreign aid for political rights enhancement in African countries may achieve the opposite results. We also discuss other implications, including the need for an “After-Washington” Consensus.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)201-221
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Economic Issues
Volume51
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 8 Mar 2017

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political right
oppression
withdrawal
threat
evidence
Berlin
recipient
uncertainty
leader
democracy

Keywords

  • Africa
  • uncertainty
  • Political rights
  • Foreign aid
  • Development

Cite this

Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries. / Asongu, Simplice; Nwachukwu, Jacinta.

In: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 51, No. 1, 08.03.2017, p. 201-221.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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