Abstract
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 201-221 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Issues |
Volume | 51 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 8 Mar 2017 |
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Keywords
- Africa
- uncertainty
- Political rights
- Foreign aid
- Development
Cite this
Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries. / Asongu, Simplice; Nwachukwu, Jacinta.
In: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 51, No. 1, 08.03.2017, p. 201-221.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries
AU - Asongu, Simplice
AU - Nwachukwu, Jacinta
PY - 2017/3/8
Y1 - 2017/3/8
N2 - This article complements existing literature on the aid-institutions nexus by focusing on political rights, aid volatilities, and the post-Berlin Wall period. Our findings show that, while foreign aid does not have a significant effect on political rights, foreign aid volatilities do mitigate democracy in recipient countries. Such volatilities could be used by populist parties to promote a neocolonial agenda, instill nationalistic sentiments, and consolidate their grip on power. This is especially true when donors are asking for standards that the majority of the population in control does not want and political leaders are unwilling to implement them. Our empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period from 1996 to 2010. As a main policy implication, creating uncertainties in foreign aid for political rights enhancement in African countries may achieve the opposite results. We also discuss other implications, including the need for an “After-Washington” Consensus.
AB - This article complements existing literature on the aid-institutions nexus by focusing on political rights, aid volatilities, and the post-Berlin Wall period. Our findings show that, while foreign aid does not have a significant effect on political rights, foreign aid volatilities do mitigate democracy in recipient countries. Such volatilities could be used by populist parties to promote a neocolonial agenda, instill nationalistic sentiments, and consolidate their grip on power. This is especially true when donors are asking for standards that the majority of the population in control does not want and political leaders are unwilling to implement them. Our empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period from 1996 to 2010. As a main policy implication, creating uncertainties in foreign aid for political rights enhancement in African countries may achieve the opposite results. We also discuss other implications, including the need for an “After-Washington” Consensus.
KW - Africa
KW - uncertainty
KW - Political rights
KW - Foreign aid
KW - Development
U2 - 10.1080/00213624.2017.1287510
DO - 10.1080/00213624.2017.1287510
M3 - Article
VL - 51
SP - 201
EP - 221
JO - Journal of Economic Issues
JF - Journal of Economic Issues
IS - 1
ER -