Insider Trading and CEO Pay-Gap Induced Turnover

Viet Le, Ann-Ngoc Nguyen, Andros Gregoriou, William Forbes

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Abstract

We explore how insider trading returns, disparities in executive pay, and CEO turnover are interrelated. Our findings reveal both independent and interactive effects for insider trading returns, the CEO pay gap, and the likelihood of CEO turnover. First, an increase in abnormal returns from insider purchases lowers the probability of a CEO’s turnover, while an increase in abnormal returns from insider sales increases the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Second, the CEO pay gap negatively affects the probability of CEO turnover for insider purchases, but it does not have a similar effect on insider sales. Third, the interaction between insider abnormal returns and any CEO pay disparity influences the impact of these returns on CEO turnover. Specifically, this interaction diminishes the positive effect of insider selling on the probability of a CEO’s dismissal, offsets the negative effect of insider purchasing on CEO dismissal, and, finally, amplifies the negative impact of CEO pay disparity on the probability of a CEO’s dismissal during periods witnessing insider purchases.
Original languageEnglish
Article number483
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Risk and Financial Management
Volume17
Issue number11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 27 Oct 2024

Bibliographical note

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Keywords

  • insider abnormal returns
  • CEO pay-gap induced turnover
  • CEO entrenchment

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