Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games

Edward Cartwright, Anna Stepanova, Lian Xue

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)
21 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper, we revisit the evidence for framing effects in threshold public good games. Our particular focus is on why the probability of providing the public good appears to be higher in positive, give frames compared with negative, take frames. We show that the impulse balance theory can explain this effect. We also report a new experiment designed to test the predictions of the impulse balance theory. The results of the experiment fit well, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, with our predictions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)903-922
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume21
Issue number5
Early online date25 Jan 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2019

Bibliographical note

© 2019 The Authors. Journal of Public Economic Theory. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Finance

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this