Abstract
In this paper, we revisit the evidence for framing effects in threshold public good games. Our particular focus is on why the probability of providing the public good appears to be higher in positive, give frames compared with negative, take frames. We show that the impulse balance theory can explain this effect. We also report a new experiment designed to test the predictions of the impulse balance theory. The results of the experiment fit well, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, with our predictions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | (In-press) |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
| Volume | (In-press) |
| Early online date | 25 Jan 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 25 Jan 2019 |
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Bibliographical note
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of Public Economic Theory. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Sociology and Political Science
- Finance
Cite this
Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games. / Cartwright, Edward; Stepanova, Anna; Xue, Lian.
In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. (In-press), 25.01.2019, p. (In-press).Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games
AU - Cartwright, Edward
AU - Stepanova, Anna
AU - Xue, Lian
N1 - © 2019 The Authors. Journal of Public Economic Theory. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
PY - 2019/1/25
Y1 - 2019/1/25
N2 - In this paper, we revisit the evidence for framing effects in threshold public good games. Our particular focus is on why the probability of providing the public good appears to be higher in positive, give frames compared with negative, take frames. We show that the impulse balance theory can explain this effect. We also report a new experiment designed to test the predictions of the impulse balance theory. The results of the experiment fit well, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, with our predictions.
AB - In this paper, we revisit the evidence for framing effects in threshold public good games. Our particular focus is on why the probability of providing the public good appears to be higher in positive, give frames compared with negative, take frames. We show that the impulse balance theory can explain this effect. We also report a new experiment designed to test the predictions of the impulse balance theory. The results of the experiment fit well, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, with our predictions.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85060630521&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/jpet.12359
DO - 10.1111/jpet.12359
M3 - Article
VL - (In-press)
SP - (In-press)
JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory
SN - 1467-9779
ER -