Hotel outsourcing under asset specificity: “The good, the bad and the ugly”

Glauco De Vita, A. Tekaya

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21 Citations (Scopus)
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This paper presents three case studies developed to investigate outsourcing outcomes in the Tunisian hotel industry. The paper applies a transaction cost economics (TCE) logic to examine potential contracting problems stemming from hotel outsourcing under asset specificity conditions. Working within the tradition of post-positivism, we find case study evidence of significant falsification value regarding TCE propositions on the performance consequences of unilateral and bilateral relation-specific investments and their holdup potential. Our insights have important practical implications for the management of hotel outsourcing relationships characterized by high asset specificity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97–106
JournalTourism Management
Early online date7 Oct 2014
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2015
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Tourism Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Tourism Management, [VOL 47, (2015)] DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2014.09.012

© 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International


  • Financial crisis
  • Firm value
  • Exposure
  • Exchange rate risk


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