Hotel outsourcing under asset specificity: “The good, the bad and the ugly”

Glauco De Vita, A. Tekaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)
169 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper presents three case studies developed to investigate outsourcing outcomes in the Tunisian hotel industry. The paper applies a transaction cost economics (TCE) logic to examine potential contracting problems stemming from hotel outsourcing under asset specificity conditions. Working within the tradition of post-positivism, we find case study evidence of significant falsification value regarding TCE propositions on the performance consequences of unilateral and bilateral relation-specific investments and their holdup potential. Our insights have important practical implications for the management of hotel outsourcing relationships characterized by high asset specificity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97–106
JournalTourism Management
Volume47
Early online date7 Oct 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2015
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

outsourcing
Hotels
Outsourcing
assets
transaction cost
transaction costs
falsification
bilateral relations
Economics
positivism
economics
Costs
industry
management
performance
evidence
Asset specificity
Values
Industry
Transaction cost economics

Bibliographical note

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Tourism Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Tourism Management, [VOL 47, (2015)] DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2014.09.012

© 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

  • Financial crisis
  • Firm value
  • Exposure
  • Exchange rate risk

Cite this

Hotel outsourcing under asset specificity: “The good, the bad and the ugly”. / De Vita, Glauco; Tekaya, A.

In: Tourism Management, Vol. 47, 04.2015, p. 97–106.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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