Governance transformations through regulations in the electricity sector: The Dutch case

Albert Jolink, Eva Niesten

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The liberalization and re-regulation of the European electricity industries have been driven by the European Commission's attempt to create one internal competitive electricity market. The European electricity directives require the vertical separation of the European electricity firms to enable the introduction of market forms of governance. Transaction cost economics argues for the efficiency of vertical integration in this industry on the basis of the attributes of the transactions that are characterized by a great degree of asset-specificity and uncertainty. This paper poses the questions whether regulation has led to the prospected outcome of governance transformations to the market and whether and how the attributes of transactions adapt to the altered forms of governance. We answer these questions by analyzing the empirics of the Dutch electricity industry. We found that the market forms of governance did not emerge, the attributes of the transactions are relatively inert and that regulation at most has led to second-best governance solutions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)499-508
Number of pages10
JournalInternational Review of Applied Economics
Volume22
Issue number4
Early online date6 Jun 2008
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2008
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

electricity
electricity industry
governance
regulation
transaction
vertical integration
market
transaction cost
European Commission
industry
liberalization
empirics
transaction costs
assets
economics
attribute
Electricity sector
Governance
uncertainty
firm

Keywords

  • Electricity industries
  • Liberalization
  • Regulation
  • Transaction cost economics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development

Cite this

Governance transformations through regulations in the electricity sector : The Dutch case. / Jolink, Albert; Niesten, Eva.

In: International Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 22, No. 4, 07.2008, p. 499-508.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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