Gender differences in cheating: Loss vs. gain framing

Lara Ezquerra, Gueorgui Kolev, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We use the die-paradigm to study gender differences in cheating behavior. We find that i) both males and females do not cheat in the absence of financial incentives, ii) both males and females cheat (but not maximally) if reports are associated with financial gains or losses, and iii) males and females do not cheat differentially.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)46-49
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume163
Early online date22 Nov 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2018
Externally publishedYes

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Bibliographical note

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters 163, (2018)
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.016

© 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

  • Cheating
  • Incentives
  • Gender differences
  • Loss aversion
  • Framing
  • Experiment

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