FINANCIAL CRISES: A CULTURE OF COMPLACENCY

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to consider the role of complacency in financial crises over the last two decades, with a closer look at the ongoing Subprime Mortgage Financial Crisis. The theme of complacency and the concept of financial crisis are both explored. Financial crises are better understood by explaining their economic drivers and the fundamental role of complacency in the various transmission mechanisms involved. These drivers are then illustrated by means of recent selected financial crises including the Crash of 1987, the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Long Term Capital Management Crisis of 1998, the Dot.Com Crash of 2000, and the current Subprime Mortgage Financial Crisis. The paper concludes that complacency not only underlies but plays a pivotal role in recent financial crises. Complacency increases during periods of economic stability, leading to some departure from rational investment decisions, an effect which is then compounded by herding behaviour. Further, with regard to the governance of markets, complacency is both institutional and institutionalised. Finally, adding to this culture of complacency is the irrational belief that crises are unique and therefore cannot be spotted in advance or even in their early stages. To address this culture of complacency, remedies lie in the re-education of key players and the provision of better financial information, a rethink of market governance structures, and some recognition that the transmission mechanisms are both recurring and predictable.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)7-23
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Organisational Transformation and Social Change
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 5 Sep 2013
Externally publishedYes

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Bibliographical note

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in
Journal of Organisational Transformation and Social Change on 05/09/2013
available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1386/jots.7.1.7_1

Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Keywords

  • Financial crises
  • Transmission mechanisms
  • Subprime mortgages
  • Contagion
  • Complacency

Cite this

FINANCIAL CRISES: A CULTURE OF COMPLACENCY. / Tucker, Jon.

In: Journal of Organisational Transformation and Social Change, Vol. 7, No. 1, 05.09.2013, p. 7-23.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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