Expressing properties of coalitional ability under resource bounds

N. Alechina, B. Logan, N.H. Nga, A. Rakib

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceedingpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce Coalition Logic for Resource Games (CLRG) which extends Coalition Logic by allowing explicit reasoning about resource endowments of coalitions of agents and resource bounds on strategies. We show how to express interesting properties of coalitional ability under resource bounds in this logic, including properties of Coalitional Resource Games introduced by Wooldridge and Dunne in [1]. We also give an efficient model-checking algorithm for CLRG which makes it possible to verify the properties automatically.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLogic, Rationality, and Interaction - Second International Workshop, LORI 2009, Proceedings
Pages1-14
Number of pages14
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event2nd International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction, LORI-II - Chongqing, China
Duration: 8 Oct 200911 Oct 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5834 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference2nd International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction, LORI-II
Country/TerritoryChina
CityChongqing
Period8/10/0911/10/09

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