Low profit margins have become a significant barrier to investment in and the operation of electric vehicle-charging infrastructure, leading to an urgent need for new business models. Notwithstanding, nonmandatory policies and unclear responsibilities create a social dilemma in which it is difficult to promote charging facilities in urban residential areas. This study examines the feasibility of overcoming this dilemma by examining possible incentive mechanisms involving government, charging infrastructure operators, real estate agencies, and electric vehicle users. Leveraging evolutionary game theory, this study designs a theoretical model based on strategic interactions among different agents in promoting charging facilities in urban residential areas. Our results indicate that (1) the optimal scenario in one in which all participants work closely together to popularize charging facilities, and this scenario has theoretical possibilities in the real world; (2) government subsidies are necessary but not sufficient for promoting charging facilities in urban residential areas; (3) electric vehicle user participation in promotion is critical; and (4) the operation model in this study is more economically efficient than prevalent industrial operation models, and the role of real estate agencies cannot be ignored.
Bibliographical noteNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Energy. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Energy, 239, Part D, (2022) DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2021.122281
© 2021, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
This study is supported by the Chinese National Funding of Social Science (Grant No. 18BJY066 ) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. 2021CDJSKJC14 ). The authors appreciate the anonymous referees and the editor for their valuable comments. The authors would like to thank Editage ( https://www.editage.cn ) for English language editing.
© 2021 Elsevier Ltd
FunderThis study is supported by the Chinese National Funding of Social Science (Grant No. 18BJY066 ) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. 2021CDJSKJC14 ).
- Charging infrastructure
- Evolutionary dynamics
- Incentive mechanisms
- Public–private partnership cooperation
- Real estate
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Civil and Structural Engineering
- Building and Construction
- Modelling and Simulation
- Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
- Fuel Technology
- Energy Engineering and Power Technology
- Mechanical Engineering
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering