Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

E. Cartwright, A. Stepanova

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)
10 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1163-1191
Number of pages29
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume46
Issue number4
Early online date4 Mar 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2017

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Prediction
Impulse
Experiment
Quantal response

Bibliographical note

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

Keywords

  • Public good
  • Threshold
  • Impulse balance theory
  • Quantal response
  • Ordinal potential
  • Forced contribution

Cite this

Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. / Cartwright, E.; Stepanova, A.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 46, No. 4, 11.2017, p. 1163-1191.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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