Abstract
We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1163-1191 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 4 Mar 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2017 |
Bibliographical note
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.Keywords
- Public good
- Threshold
- Impulse balance theory
- Quantal response
- Ordinal potential
- Forced contribution