Econometric modelling of UK executive compensation

Martin J. Conyon, Simon I. Peck, Graham Sadler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An examination of insider trading before and after the announcement of Credit Watch placements sheds new light on the study of both bond rating changes and insider trading. This paper utilizes Credit Watch placements classified by 11 identifiable trigger events for the years 1981-1990. We find significant insider purchases before positive implication placements, but no sales before negative implication placements. Among individual trigger events, we observe significant insider purchases before and after placements due to improved operating performance, bidding on a firm with a higher debt rating and firms increasing their debt-to-equity ratios. Significant insider purchases are found before placements due to purchasing assets. Significant insider sales are found before and after placements due to poor operating performance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3-20
Number of pages18
JournalManagerial Finance
Volume26
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2000
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Executive compensation
Econometric modelling
Placement
Insider
Purchase
Insider trading
Debt
Operating performance
Credit
Trigger
Purchasing
Equity
Rating
Announcement
Assets
Bond ratings
Bidding

Keywords

  • Corporate governance
  • Executive compensation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Econometric modelling of UK executive compensation. / Conyon, Martin J.; Peck, Simon I.; Sadler, Graham.

In: Managerial Finance, Vol. 26, No. 9, 01.01.2000, p. 3-20.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Conyon, Martin J. ; Peck, Simon I. ; Sadler, Graham. / Econometric modelling of UK executive compensation. In: Managerial Finance. 2000 ; Vol. 26, No. 9. pp. 3-20.
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