E-voting: Dependability requirements and design for dependability

J.W. Bryans; B. Littlewood; P.Y.A. Ryan; L. Strigini

doi:10.1109/ARES.2006.56

E-voting: Dependability requirements and design for dependability

J.W. Bryans, B. Littlewood, P.Y.A. Ryan, L. Strigini

City, University of London

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding › peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Elections are increasingly dependent on computers and telecommunication systems. Such "E-voting" schemes create socio-technical systems (combinations of technology and human organisations) that are complex and critical, as the future of nations depends on their proper operation. Thus heated debate surrounds their adoption and the possible methods for making them demonstrably dependable. We discuss the dependability requirements for such systems, and the design issues in ensuring their satisfaction, with reference to a recent proposal that uses cryptography for fault tolerance, in order to avoid some of the perceived dangers of electronic voting. Our treatment highlights the need for considering the whole socio-technical system, and for integrating security and fault tolerance viewpoints.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	ARES '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Publisher	ACM
Pages	988-995
Number of pages	8
Volume	2006
ISBN (Print)	0-7695-2567-9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2006.56
Publication status	Published - 2006

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10.1109/ARES.2006.56

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abstract = "Elections are increasingly dependent on computers and telecommunication systems. Such {"}E-voting{"} schemes create socio-technical systems (combinations of technology and human organisations) that are complex and critical, as the future of nations depends on their proper operation. Thus heated debate surrounds their adoption and the possible methods for making them demonstrably dependable. We discuss the dependability requirements for such systems, and the design issues in ensuring their satisfaction, with reference to a recent proposal that uses cryptography for fault tolerance, in order to avoid some of the perceived dangers of electronic voting. Our treatment highlights the need for considering the whole socio-technical system, and for integrating security and fault tolerance viewpoints.",

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Y1 - 2006

N2 - Elections are increasingly dependent on computers and telecommunication systems. Such "E-voting" schemes create socio-technical systems (combinations of technology and human organisations) that are complex and critical, as the future of nations depends on their proper operation. Thus heated debate surrounds their adoption and the possible methods for making them demonstrably dependable. We discuss the dependability requirements for such systems, and the design issues in ensuring their satisfaction, with reference to a recent proposal that uses cryptography for fault tolerance, in order to avoid some of the perceived dangers of electronic voting. Our treatment highlights the need for considering the whole socio-technical system, and for integrating security and fault tolerance viewpoints.

AB - Elections are increasingly dependent on computers and telecommunication systems. Such "E-voting" schemes create socio-technical systems (combinations of technology and human organisations) that are complex and critical, as the future of nations depends on their proper operation. Thus heated debate surrounds their adoption and the possible methods for making them demonstrably dependable. We discuss the dependability requirements for such systems, and the design issues in ensuring their satisfaction, with reference to a recent proposal that uses cryptography for fault tolerance, in order to avoid some of the perceived dangers of electronic voting. Our treatment highlights the need for considering the whole socio-technical system, and for integrating security and fault tolerance viewpoints.

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DO - 10.1109/ARES.2006.56

M3 - Conference proceeding

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BT - ARES '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

PB - ACM

ER -

E-voting: Dependability requirements and design for dependability

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