Corporate Governance Regulation: A Practice Theory Perspective

Franklin Nakpodia; Emmanuel Adegbite; Folajimi Ashiru

doi:10.1080/01559982.2021.1995934

Corporate Governance Regulation: A Practice Theory Perspective

Franklin Nakpodia, Emmanuel Adegbite, Folajimi Ashiru

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

390 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Employing Bourdieu’s practice theory, this paper explores factors that influence corporate executives’ behaviour towards corporate governance regulation. Drawing insights from a weak institutional environment (Nigeria) and relying on a qualitative research methodology (semi-structured interviews with 31 executives), this research uncovers how nine nuanced situational and cultural field factors determine executives’ regulatory response to the severity of punishment, the certainty of penalties, and the cost–benefit compliance considerations. The study further explains how sequential rationalisation between the severity and certainty of punishment contributes to the regulatory apathy that executives exhibit. Theoretically, this study demonstrates how practice theory components (habitus, capital, and field) blend to establish executives’ regulatory practice.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	73-98
Number of pages	26
Journal	Accounting Forum
Volume	47
Issue number	1
Early online date	5 Dec 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/01559982.2021.1995934
Publication status	Published - 2 Jan 2023

Bibliographical note

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Funder

The authors wish to thank the Journal's editor (Professor Carol Tilt) and the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments in helping us to improve the quality of the paper. We are also highly indebted to the participants of this study who cannot be identified due to confidential reasons. Early versions of this paper were presented at the International Conference on Corporate Governance and Business Ethics held in Singapore in July 2018 and the Global Regulatory Governance Research Network Conference held in Hong Kong in July 2019. The authors appreciate the comments and feedback received from participants at these conferences. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

Keywords

Carol Tilt
Corporate governance
certainty
practice theory
regulation
regulatory habitus
severity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Accounting
Finance

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10.1080/01559982.2021.1995934Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

Nakpodia et al 2021Accepted author manuscript, 1.11 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND
PublishedFinal published version, 1.57 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND
Corporate governance regulation a practice theory perspectiveFinal published version, 2.95 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "Corporate Governance Regulation: A Practice Theory Perspective",

abstract = "Employing Bourdieu{\textquoteright}s practice theory, this paper explores factors that influence corporate executives{\textquoteright} behaviour towards corporate governance regulation. Drawing insights from a weak institutional environment (Nigeria) and relying on a qualitative research methodology (semi-structured interviews with 31 executives), this research uncovers how nine nuanced situational and cultural field factors determine executives{\textquoteright} regulatory response to the severity of punishment, the certainty of penalties, and the cost–benefit compliance considerations. The study further explains how sequential rationalisation between the severity and certainty of punishment contributes to the regulatory apathy that executives exhibit. Theoretically, this study demonstrates how practice theory components (habitus, capital, and field) blend to establish executives{\textquoteright} regulatory practice.",

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Corporate Governance Regulation: A Practice Theory Perspective

Abstract

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Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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