Corporate Governance Regulation: A Practice Theory Perspective

Franklin Nakpodia, Emmanuel Adegbite, Folajimi Ashiru

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
22 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Employing Bourdieu’s practice theory, this paper explores factors that influence corporate executives’ behaviour towards corporate governance regulation. Drawing insights from a weak institutional environment (Nigeria) and relying on a qualitative research methodology (semi-structured interviews with 31 executives), this research uncovers how nine nuanced situational and cultural field factors determine executives’ regulatory response to the severity of punishment, the certainty of penalties, and the cost–benefit compliance considerations. The study further explains how sequential rationalisation between the severity and certainty of punishment contributes to the regulatory apathy that executives exhibit. Theoretically, this study demonstrates how practice theory components (habitus, capital, and field) blend to establish executives’ regulatory practice.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)(In-Press)
Number of pages26
JournalAccounting Forum
Volume(In-Press)
Early online date5 Dec 2021
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 5 Dec 2021

Bibliographical note

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Keywords

  • Carol Tilt
  • Corporate governance
  • certainty
  • practice theory
  • regulation
  • regulatory habitus
  • severity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance

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