Beliefs are object-attribute associations of varying strength

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review


    Associative theories of cognitive representation begin with an ontology of two kinds of entities: concepts and associations. According to most social cognitive theories of attitudes, attitudes are object-evaluation associations of varying strength, where strength is defined in terms of accessibility. This paper proposes a cognitive account of belief such that beliefs are object-attribute associations of varying strength: thus, insofar as evaluative concepts are examples of attribute concepts, attitudes are a species of belief. This cognitive account of belief also denies that additional processes of endorsement - explicit or otherwise - are strictly required for an object-attribute association to count as a belief.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)284-301
    Number of pages18
    JournalContemporary Pragmatism
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2018


    • Attitude
    • Belief
    • Cognitive association
    • Social cognition
    • Social psychology

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Philosophy


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