Beliefs are object-attribute associations of varying strength

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

Associative theories of cognitive representation begin with an ontology of two kinds of entities: concepts and associations. According to most social cognitive theories of attitudes, attitudes are object-evaluation associations of varying strength, where strength is defined in terms of accessibility. This paper proposes a cognitive account of belief such that beliefs are object-attribute associations of varying strength: thus, insofar as evaluative concepts are examples of attribute concepts, attitudes are a species of belief. This cognitive account of belief also denies that additional processes of endorsement - explicit or otherwise - are strictly required for an object-attribute association to count as a belief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)284-301
Number of pages18
JournalContemporary Pragmatism
Volume15
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2018

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Accessibility
Ontology
Social Cognitive Theory
Evaluation
Associative
Entity

Keywords

  • Attitude
  • Belief
  • Cognitive association
  • Social cognition
  • Social psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Beliefs are object-attribute associations of varying strength. / Jong, Jonathan.

In: Contemporary Pragmatism, Vol. 15, No. 3, 01.01.2018, p. 284-301.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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