Abstract
Can identical goods sell at different prices in identical markets when people are perfectly mobile? We provide a formal account of strategic behaviour in large games with many commodities, and exhibit how it drives price dispersion at equilibrium. Interactions between agents are modelled using a Shapley-Shubik market game. We demonstrate the failure of the law of one price in this setup through a robust counterexample. The proposed model, and our findings, constitute an alternative and plausible explanation to some "anomalies" which routinely appear in a wide array of fields, ranging from banking, business economics, to international, and labour economics.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 24-28 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 179 |
| Early online date | 12 Mar 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2019 |
Bibliographical note
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, [179] (2019)] DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.004
© 2019, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Keywords
- Oligopoly
- Infinite-dimensional commodity space
- Arbitrage
- Strategic behaviour
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Finance