Accounting Performance Inflated by Private Equity before IPOs: Evidence from Chinese Firms

Hong Bo, Boying Xu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

How does private equity (PE) investment affect recipient firms? Existing research based on firms in mature financial markets (hereafter mature firms) has documented three possible mechanisms: First, PE investment brings in new financing to the firm, which releases financial constraints faced by the firm and supports the firm’s real activities (e.g., Brown and Floras, 2012). Second, PE investment improves corporate governance of the recipient firm because PE investors being the firm’s new shareholders will strengthen the monitoring of managers and influence the firm’s decision making (e.g.,Wright et al.,2009). Third, PE investment sends a positive signal about the recipient firm’s future perspectives to outside potential investors (e.g., Megginson and Weiss, 1991;Janney and Folta, 2003). Among these possible mechanisms, the governance role of PE has been at the center of discussion in the standard PE literature based on mature firms. This governance role is particularly documented for PE investment in the form of management buyouts (MBOs), in which top managers purchase the firm using private equity funds. Consequently, PE investors often hold a reasonably large amount of equity of the recipient firm after the transaction; hence MBOs normally result in a higher degree of ownership concentration of the recipient firm, which provides shareholders, including PE investors as the firm’s new shareholders, with stronger incentives to monitor the management (e.g., Wright et al., 2009).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSustainable Entrepreneurship in China
EditorsD Cumming, M Firth, W Hou, E Lee
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Pages127-157
Number of pages11
ISBN (Print)9781137412522
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Chinese firms
Private equity
Accounting performance
Investors
Shareholders
New firms
Managers
Governance
Management buyouts
Equity
Purchase
Decision making
Monitoring
Financial constraints
Financing
Financial markets
Real activity
Incentives
Corporate governance
Ownership concentration

Keywords

  • Transportation
  • Income
  • Fishing

Cite this

Bo, H., & Xu, B. (2015). Accounting Performance Inflated by Private Equity before IPOs: Evidence from Chinese Firms. In D. Cumming, M. Firth, W. Hou, & E. Lee (Eds.), Sustainable Entrepreneurship in China (pp. 127-157). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137412539_6

Accounting Performance Inflated by Private Equity before IPOs : Evidence from Chinese Firms. / Bo, Hong; Xu, Boying.

Sustainable Entrepreneurship in China. ed. / D Cumming; M Firth; W Hou; E Lee. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. p. 127-157.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Bo, H & Xu, B 2015, Accounting Performance Inflated by Private Equity before IPOs: Evidence from Chinese Firms. in D Cumming, M Firth, W Hou & E Lee (eds), Sustainable Entrepreneurship in China. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 127-157. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137412539_6
Bo H, Xu B. Accounting Performance Inflated by Private Equity before IPOs: Evidence from Chinese Firms. In Cumming D, Firth M, Hou W, Lee E, editors, Sustainable Entrepreneurship in China. Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. p. 127-157 https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137412539_6
Bo, Hong ; Xu, Boying. / Accounting Performance Inflated by Private Equity before IPOs : Evidence from Chinese Firms. Sustainable Entrepreneurship in China. editor / D Cumming ; M Firth ; W Hou ; E Lee. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. pp. 127-157
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