A new pricing function for power control game in wireless data networks

Abdorasoul Ghasemi, Karim Faez, Mehdi Dehghan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceedingpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a new pricing function for noncooperative power control game in a single cell CDMA data network. Considering a utility function for each terminal, the purpose of power control in wireless data networks is to maximize network utility. In the proposed game, the pricing function is a linear function of the terminal's Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR). We first prove that the new game is a supermodular game and then we show the strategy space of the new game is such that it is possible to reach better equilibrium point compared to pricing function based on terminal's power. Simulation results show that the game with the proposed pricing function can improve the utility and power consumption of the terminals at equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
PublisherIEEE
Pages1162-1166
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)1424400635, 9781424400638
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 26 Feb 2007
Externally publishedYes
Event2006 IEEE 64th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-2006 Fall - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 25 Sept 200628 Sept 2006

Publication series

NameIEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
ISSN (Print)1550-2252

Conference

Conference2006 IEEE 64th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-2006 Fall
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period25/09/0628/09/06

Keywords

  • Pricing
  • Power control
  • Quality of service
  • Telephony
  • Signal to noise ratio
  • Game theory
  • Interference
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Multiaccess communication
  • Delay

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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